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Abstract 
In the absence of a vaccine or more effective treatment options, containing the spread of novel 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) must rely on non-pharmaceutical interventions. All U.S. 
states adopted social-distancing measures in March and April of 2020, though they varied in both 
timing and scope. Kentucky began by closing public schools and restaurant dining rooms on 
March 16th before progressing to closing other non-essential businesses and eventually issuing a 
“Healthy at Home” order with restrictions similar to the shelter-in-place (SIPO) orders adopted 
by other states. We aim to quantify the impact of these measures on COVID-19 case growth in 
the state. An event-study model allows us to link adoption of social distancing measures across 
the Midwest and South to the growth rate of cases, allowing for effects to emerge gradually to 
account for the lag between infection and positive test result. We then use the results to predict 
how the number of cases would have evolved in Kentucky in the absence of these policy 
measures – in other words, if the state had relied on voluntary social distancing alone. We 
estimate that, by April 25, Kentucky would have had 44,482 confirmed COVID-19 cases without 
social distancing restrictions, as opposed to the 3,857 actually observed.  
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I. Introduction 
The COVID-19 pandemic has quickly become not only the defining public health 
challenge of our time but also the greatest economic threat since the Great Recession. As cases 
began to emerge in the United States in March of 2020, states and localities implemented social 
distancing restrictions that varied in timing and scope. In Kentucky, the first major interventions 
took effect on March 16, when Governor Andy Beshear closed public schools and the dining-in 
sections of restaurants and bars (Beshear, 2020). Governor Beshear soon closed other non-
essential businesses, banned large gatherings, and ultimately declared that the state’s “Healthy at 
Home” directive was functionally equivalent to the shelter-in-place orders (SIPOs) enacted in 
most states (Baker, 2020; Aulbach, 2020). These suppression measures are recommended as a 
necessary step in a recent road map by American Enterprise Institute to reopening the economy 
(Gottlieb et al., 2020). 
The “Opening Up America Again” guidelines issued by the Trump administration 
identify conditions when a state can safely proceed to a gradual reopening. These include a 
downward trajectory of documented cases within a 14-day period (or positive tests as a percent 
of total tests), sufficient health care capacity such that hospitals can safely able to treat all 
patients without crisis care, and a robust testing program in place for at-risk healthcare workers, 
including emerging antibody testing (The White House, 2020). With states beginning to 
gradually reopen parts of their economies as part of this phase, evidence to help policymakers 
strike the best balance between protecting public health and avoiding continued economic 
collapse is urgently needed. If less invasive restrictions such as school closures and large event 
bans can achieve nearly the same reduction in COVID-19 case growth as more comprehensive 
measures such as SIPOs, then extreme restrictions are likely not necessary moving forward. In 
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contrast, if strong measures are the only way to achieve substantial mitigation, then the benefits 
of lengthy SIPOs could outweigh their substantial costs. 
Theoretically, the extent to which SIPOs flatten the curve once closures of schools and 
many types of businesses are already in place is unclear. On one hand, SIPOs may be largely 
redundant if the main sources of community spread have already been eliminated. SIPOs are also 
difficult to enforce and many (including Kentucky’s) do not specify formal penalties for 
violations (Mazziotta, 2020). SIPOs may therefore be best characterized as a “nudge” with social 
pressure being the main channel through which they could work (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). On 
the other hand, SIPOs might be necessary if closing gathering places like schools and restaurants 
simply redirects social activities towards other settings, such as parks or houses. Explicitly 
prohibiting such gatherings in all settings, including informal ones, may be necessary to 
substantially slow the spread. 
Epidemiological models link the frequency and nature of social interactions to case 
growth but tend to simply assume that particular government restrictions can reduce these 
interactions to a given level. For instance, Thunstrom et al. (forthcoming) rely on measures from 
the 1918 influenza pandemic to assume that social-distancing measures will reduce the average 
contact rate by 38 percent. The well-known Imperial College London and University of 
Washington models project case trajectories with social distancing versus no social distancing, 
but they are agnostic about how the specified level of social distancing will be achieved 
(Ferguson et al., 2020; The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2020). Economists’ 
policy evaluation toolkit can therefore help fill a critical void in the literature.  
Accordingly, recent studies provide evidence on the effectiveness of these social-
distancing measures in the U.S., but their relevance for Kentucky is unclear. Abouk and Heydari 
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(2020), Andersen (2020), Engle, Stromme and Zhou (2020), Gubta et al. (2020), Painter and Qiu 
(2020), Siedner et al. (2020) and Tucker and Yu (2020) all use publicly available aggregated 
mobility data obtained from cell phones to document the extent to which social distancing 
restrictions influence movement. Friedson et al. (2020) find that California’s SIPO reduced 
COVID-19 case growth in the first three weeks following its implementation, while Dave et al. 
(2020) find evidence that SIPOs are most effective in early adopting states and those with high 
population densities. Siedner et al. (2020) find that early social distancing restrictions of any 
type, but not later SIPOs, decreased states’ COVID-19 growth rates. In cross-sectional state-level 
analyses, Orazem (2020) and Reilly (2020) do not find evidence that SIPOs inhibit COVID-19 
caseload growth.  Courtemanche et al. (2020) estimate an event-study model with all U.S. 
counties and show that SIPOs strongly reduced the growth rate of COVID-19 cases, while 
closing entertainment-related businesses had a moderate effect. However, they find no evidence 
that closing public schools or banning large gatherings reduced case growth without a broader 
SIPO also being in place.  
We conduct a similar analysis to Courtemanche et al. (2020) but with a unique focus on 
Kentucky – a state whose early, aggressive actions to curb the spread of coronavirus, particularly 
relative to the slower response by its neighbor Tennessee – received international attention 
(Lenthang, 2020; National Public Radio, 2020). First, rather than estimating the model for the 
entire U.S., we limit the sample to counties in the states in the South and Midwest Census 
Regions, which are more comparable to Kentucky than the Northeast and West Census Regions 
that we leave out (U.S. Census Bureau). We then use the results to estimate how the COVID-19 
curve could have evolved in Kentucky without government-imposed social distancing 
restrictions – i.e. relying only on voluntary social-distancing measures taken by individuals and 
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businesses. In effect, the model leverages the fact that other states and counties in the South and 
Midwest implemented different social distancing restrictions than Kentucky, or implemented the 
same restrictions at different times, to make counterfactual predictions about what would have 
happened in Kentucky under different policy choices.    
 Similarly to the Courtemanche et al. (2020) results for the entire U.S., we find that SIPOs 
were the most effective policy in slowing the spread of COVID-19 in the Midwest and South; 
closing entertainment-related facilities such as restaurants, bars, gyms, and entertainment centers 
was the second most effective; and closing schools and banning large events in the absence of a 
SIPO had no statistically or economically significant effect. The combined impact of all of these 
measures in Kentucky was to limit the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases to 3,857 by April 
25, compared to the 44,482 that our model predicts would have occurred in their absence.  
II. Data 
Our dataset includes daily official case counts from each of the 2,477 counties (or 
equivalents such as parishes and independent cities) in the South and Midwest. Following 
Courtemanche et al. (2020), our sample period starts on March 5, 2020, the day the U.S. reached 
100 total cases (and the starting point on many graphs in the popular press of COVID-19 case 
growth). This was also the day before Kentucky’s first official case. Our sample period ends on 
April 25. The resulting sample size is 128,804 county-by-day observations. In all analyses, each 
county observation is weighted by population using 2018 estimates (United States Department of 
Agriculture, 2019).  
Our COVID-19 case data come from the Johns Hopkins Center for Systems Science and 
Engineering’s 2019 Novel Coronavirus COVID-19 Data Repository, which includes information 
from an array of sources such as government and independent health institutions (Johns Hopkins 
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University & Medicine, 2020). We use these data to compute each county’s daily exponential 
growth rate in confirmed COVID-19 cases, which is equal to the natural log of daily COVID-19 
cases minus the log of daily COVID-19 cases on the prior day, multiplied by 100 to be 
interpretable as percent. Following Bursztyn et al. (2020), we add one to the case totals to 
prevent the log of cases from being undefined when there are no cases in a county on a given 
day. The sample mean is 507 cases, so adding one is only a small distortion that does not 
materially impact the results. The growth rate was multiplied by 100 and can be read as 
percentage point changes. 
Our information on state and local government social-distancing interventions comes 
from Killeen et al. (2020). As explained in Courtemanche et al. (2020), we corrected a few errors 
in the dates, and our final lists of state- and county-level policies are shown in that study. The 
majority of the policy variation, including all variation in Kentucky, is at the state level, but a 
number of counties implemented restrictions prior to the state, and our use of county-level data 
allows these restrictions to be incorporated. 
As in Courtemanche et al. (2020), we study four separate interventions. One is whether 
public schools were closed, with the closure coded as taking effect on the first cancelled school 
day. This was March 16 in Kentucky. Another is whether there was a closure of at least some 
entertainment-related businesses. Formally, this is an indicator for either restaurant dining areas 
(including bars) or gyms/entertainment centers being closed. In practice, the two types of 
closures were almost always enacted at either the same time or close to it. In Kentucky, 
restaurants were closed on March 16 and gyms, entertainment centers, and other businesses that 
involve gathering were closed just two days later; this variable is therefore set to one starting on 
March 16. The third intervention is a ban on large gatherings that is at least as restrictive as 500 
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or more people. Most such bans, including Kentucky’s (which took effect on March 20), applied 
to gatherings of 50 or more people. Finally, the strongest restriction is the SIPO. Killeen et al. 
(2020) code Kentucky’s SIPO as starting on March 26. While Governor Beshear has not 
officially used the term SIPO, March 26 is the date he closed all non-life-sustaining business, 
which made Kentucky’s “Healthy at Home” initiative functionally equivalent to the SIPOs in 
place in other states.     
Our sample period begins on March 5, 2020, which is the day before Kentucky reported 
its first case. The number of COVID-19 cases in Kentucky grew to 3,857 by April 25, the last 
day in our sample. Figure 1 illustrates the reach of social-distancing policies on the population in 
the Midwest and South over time relative to the timing of Kentucky in implementing these 
measures (indicated by the vertical red lines). 22 percent of the population in the South and 
Midwest lived in counties where schools were already closed when Kentucky’s closure took 
effect. 41 percent of the population in these regions lived in counties with restaurant or 
entertainment center closures when Kentucky did so. When Kentucky officially banned large 
gatherings, similar orders already affected 73 percent of people in these regions. About 46 
percent of the population in these regions was covered by a SIPO at the time of Kentucky’s 
equivalent measure. On balance, then, Kentucky was implemented social-distancing restrictions 
somewhat earlier that other Midwestern and Southern states but was not an outlier.  
III. Econometric Model 
Our econometric model is an event-study-style generalization of the standard difference-
in-differences framework. Whereas difference-in-differences models include the interaction of 
indicators for treatment group and whether the time is post-treatment, an event-study model 
allows for more flexible timing of impacts by interacting treatment with several indicators of 
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time relative to treatment. Differentiating between the effects of treatments that just occurred 
versus those that occurred a longer time ago may be particularly valuable in the case of COVID-
19, where the effects of social-distancing restrictions are likely to be gradual due to incubation 
periods, delays seeking medical care after the onset of symptoms, delays obtaining COVID-19 
tests after seeking care, and waits for test results (Lauer et al., 2020). Additionally, event study 
models include indicators reflecting time before treatment, allowing for an evaluation of pre-
treatment trends. If divergence between the trends of the treatment and control groups emerges 
prior to treatment, then the observed relationships reflect unobserved confounders or reverse 
causality rather than the causal effect of the intervention on the outcome.    
Following Courtemanche et al. (2020), our event-study model contains six variables for 
each of the four types of social-distancing policies: whether it was implemented  
• 1-5 days ago, 
• 6-10 days ago, 
• 11-15 days ago, 
• 16 or more days ago, 
• -5 to -9 days ago (i.e. will be implemented 5-9 days from now), or 
• <-9 days ago (i.e. will be implemented 10 or more days from now).  
Implementation in the next five days (0 to -4 days ago) is the omitted reference group to which 
the coefficients for the other time periods are compared. For instance, the coefficient on the 
variable for “SIPO was implemented 11-15 days ago” measures the effect of starting a SIPO 11-
15 days ago instead of in the next five days.1 
 
1 The Supplemental Appendix to Courtemanche et al. (2020) provides formal notation for our event-study model.  
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 Since we include four different types of polices together in the same model, their 
coefficients represent partial effects, holding all other types of policies constant. While the 
sequence in which the restrictions on schools, businesses, and events took effect varied across 
states and counties, SIPOs were almost always implemented after at least one other restriction 
was in place – usually all three. The estimated effects of SIPOs therefore represent their 
additional impacts above and beyond prior closures. The “full” impact of issuing a SIPO – 
which, by definition, encompasses the other smaller restrictions – without any prior restrictions 
is better measured as the linear combination of the coefficients of all four policy variables in the 
specified time frame.  
Other covariates in our model are county and day fixed effects; i.e. dummy variables for 
each county and each day in the sample. The county fixed effects capture determinants of 
counties’ COVID-19 case growth rates that do not appreciably change throughout the sample 
period, such as population density, demographic characteristics of the population, and political 
orientation (Wright et al., 2020; Painter and Qiu, 2020). The day fixed effects capture common 
shocks to case growth rates shared by all counties in the U.S., such as voluntary social distancing 
in response to CDC guidance and other nationwide sources of information, international travel 
bans, and national trends in testing access. Therefore, the ability to interpret our results as causal 
effects of the policies rests on the assumption that these unmeasured factors do not change 
differentially across counties over time in a way that is correlated with the timing of the policies’ 
implementation.  
Courtemanche et al. (2020) report results from numerous robustness checks designed to 
rule out threats to the validity of this model. Their first few checks show that their statistically 
insignificant results for school closures and event bans are not due to insufficient identifying 
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variation independent from the other policies. Their other checks provide evidence that their 
main conclusions are not sensitive to excluding unique early outbreak states, constructing the 
policy variables in other defensible ways, imputing or excluding certain questionable 
observations in the case data, starting the sample at a different time, controlling for number of 
tests performed in the state, and controlling for county-specific pre-treatment trends in case 
growth rate. In unreported regressions (results available upon request), we have verified that the 
results are similarly robust to these checks in our dataset, which differs from theirs only in that 
we include nine additional days of data and exclude the West and Northeast Census Regions. 
IV. Results 
The coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals for the four social-distancing policies 
obtained from the event-study are displayed in Figure 2. The confidence intervals are based on 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by state. A variable is 
statistically significant at the 5% level if its coefficient’s confidence interval does not include 
zero. 
The upper left panel of Figure 2 shows that SIPOs led to a gradual but substantial 
reduction in the growth rate of COVID-19 cases. In the first time period after the implementation 
(1-5 days), the growth rate fell by a statistically insignificant 2.4 percentage points relative to the 
reference period of the five days before implementation. The effect became statistically 
significant in each subsequent period, growing to 3.9 percentage points after 6-10 days, 5.3 
percentage points after 11-15 days, and 8 percentage points after 16 or more days.  
The restrictions on restaurants and entertainment centers had a relatively steady effect on 
the growth rate of COVID-19 cases once in place. Closing either restaurant dining areas or 
gyms/entertainment centers (usually both) lowered the growth rate by 5 percentage points in the 
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first five days after taking effect, with the impact rising only slightly – to 6.2 percentage points – 
after 16 days. In contrast, however, we found no evidence that bans on large social gatherings or 
school closures reduced growth rates after any length of time, holding the other types of policies 
constant. The estimated effect of event bans is nearly zero and statistically insignificant, while 
the effect of closing schools is consistently positive (faster case growth), though never 
significant.  
For all four types of policies, we observe no “placebo” effect on the pre-enactment 
growth rate. All coefficient estimates representing “impacts” of future implementation are small 
and statistically insignificant. In other words, we find no evidence of bias from reverse causality 
(case growth driving policy implementation) or unobserved confounders. 
As discussed previously, the combined effects of all four policies is the best estimate of 
the overall impact of government-imposed social distancing restrictions. This combined effect 
was 5.4 percentage points in the first five days, 6.8 percentage points after 6-10 days, 7.1 
percentage points after 11-15 days, and 9.1 percentage points after 16 or more days. Only the 
second and fourth of these estimates is statistically significant at the 5% level, with the first and 
third having p-values of 0.16 and 0.12, respectively. These estimates are relatively similar to 
those for SIPOs alone, as the positive (though insignificant) effect of closing schools on case 
growth was roughly offset by the reduction from restaurant/gym/entertainment center closures. 
In other words, on average, states’ and counties’ early social distancing efforts made little 
difference in slowing the spread of COVID-19, but stronger measures implemented later were 
more successful. 
V. COVID-19 Case Growth Rate in Kentucky without Social-Distancing Policies 
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We next use these regression results to simulate a counterfactual scenario in which no 
jurisdiction in Kentucky ever implemented any social distancing restriction. To calculate the 
number of counterfactual cases, we first predict the counterfactual growth rate from the 
regression estimates discussed above by setting all of the post-implementation policy variables 
equal to zero. We do not also subtract out the “placebo” effects of the future policy 
implementation variables, since those are intended to capture unobserved confounders rather 
than part of the causal effect of the policies. The number of predicted cases on a given day is 
easily calculated from cases on the previous day and the predicted growth rate.2 Once the 
number of cases in each county and day is predicted under the given counterfactual, we can sum 
them by day to create state-by-day predicted cases. Those predicted counterfactual totals are 
estimates of how many cases the state would have if no social distancing policies had been 
implemented. 
Figure 3 compares the reported number of observed COVID-19 cases in Kentucky over 
time to the number of cases predicted by our event-study regression estimates under the 
aforementioned counterfactual scenario of no social distancing policies. The graph in the left 
panel uses the natural logarithm of Kentucky cases (or predicted cases) for the y-axis scale, but 
with corresponding numbers (in thousands) labeled on the y-axis instead of logs. The graph in 
the right panel shows presents the same numbers on a linear scale. 
Both counterfactual and observed cases increase roughly linearly on the log scale, as 
expected under exponential growth, until the beginning of April – approximately two weeks after 
the first restrictions and one week after the first SIPO. The actual path of observed cases on the 
log scale then begins to flatten substantially, while cases predicted under the counterfactual 
 
2 The details of this calculation, which uses the fact that the exponential function is the inverse of the natural 
logarithm, can be found in Courtemanche et al. (2020). 
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scenario deviate very little from their existing path. The exponential growth rate of cases under 
the counterfactual is especially striking on the linear scale in the right panel. By April 25, the 
observed number of cases reached 3,857. If no social-distancing measures had been 
implemented, our estimates predict the number of cases would have been 44,482.  
VI. Conclusion 
The finding on reduced growth in confirmed COVID-19 cases from our regional model 
that includes Kentucky finds strong agreement with other recent, credible studies on the impact 
of social distancing measures in California (Friedson et al., 2020) and across the U.S. as a whole 
(Courtemanche et al., 2020; Dave et al., 2020). Our results are also consistent with evidence that 
SIPOs and closures of restaurants/entertainment facilities reduce cell-phone-tracked measures of 
mobility, while school closures and bans on medium-sized events do not (Abouk and Heydari, 
2020; Andersen, 2020). Although the confirmed case counts that we use to create growth rates 
understate true prevalence (Hortaçsu, Liu and Schwieg, 2020; Bendavid et al., 2020), they are a 
critical metric in the Trump administration’s “Opening Up America Again” plan (The White 
House, 2020). The plan proposes either a “downward trajectory of documented cases within a 
14-day period” or “downward trajectory of positive tests as a percent of total tests within a 14-
day period (flat or increasing volume of tests)” as criteria to loosening social distancing 
measures.  
Many SIPOs are set to expire in the near future, and some of Kentucky’s neighbors are 
reopening (Mervosh and Lee 2020). Georgia, which has had a SIPO in place since April 3, 
allowed gyms, hair and nail salons, bowling alleys and tattoo parlors to reopen on April 24, and 
restaurants, movie theaters, and other entertainment to reopen on April 27. Oklahoma did not 
have a SIPO, but lifted restrictions on salons, barbers and pet groomers on April 24, and 
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scheduled restaurant dining, movie theaters, gyms, houses of worship and sporting venues to 
reopen on May 1. South Carolina’s SIPO has been in effect since April 7, and began reopening 
on April 20 with retail stores, operating at reduced capacity. Tennessee’s SIPO is set to expire 
April 30, although restaurants will reopen starting April 27, with retail stores to follow, both 
operating at reduced capacity. 
 The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (2020) projects June 14 as the day 
Kentucky can consider relaxing social distancing measures with a containment strategy. Some of 
the other states that are currently relaxing social distancing measures – Georgia, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, and Tennessee – have projections of June 22, June 17, June 8, and May 20, 
respectively. According to these projections, few states are currently positioned to reopen in the 
very near future, even with a containment strategy (Huth and Wu, 2020). 
 Weighing health benefits against economic harms – and the debate about appropriate 
timing for reopening – will continue. Some recent analyses either deny the existence of health 
benefits or argue that such concerns are only important for hot spots such as New York City, but 
are irrelevant elsewhere (Reilly, 2020; Rodgers, 2020). Their conclusions are based on poorly 
specified empirical models that do not produce appropriate counterfactual findings.3 Our event-
study model – focused on the Midwest and South – strongly rebuts the idea that social distancing 
policies are ineffective or irrelevant. In Kentucky, our forecasts find that confirmed COVID-19 
cases would be ten times higher without government-imposed social distancing restrictions. 
Kentucky’s fatality rate for confirmed cases is approximately 5 percent. Under the assumption 
 
3 In particular, cross-sectional analyses like those of Reilly (2020) and Rodgers (2020) cannot separate the causal 
effect of social distancing policies on the severity of the COVID-19 outbreak from the reverse-causal effect of 
outbreak severity influencing timing of adoption. This leads to bias in the direction of underestimating the 
effectiveness of the restrictions.   
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that individuals who did not become confirmed cases as a result of these restrictions would have 
died at the same rate, our results suggest that they have prevented more than 2,000 fatalities.4  
Our model’s estimates also suggest that returning to partial measures – as some 
neighboring states are – would be insufficient to curb the spread of the virus. Specifically, we 
find no evidence that school closures and bans of moderate-sized events have any effect at all on 
the growth rate of COVID-19 cases unless accompanied by broader shelter-in-place directives 
such as Kentucky’s “Healthy at Home” initiative. While such findings may appear paradoxical, 
they are consistent with the economic concept of substitution. Certainly COVID-19 can spread at 
schools and group events, but that does not imply that closing/banning them slows the spread. 
The effect depends on what individuals do in the absence of these activities. Kids who are out of 
school may simply end up in different social settings such as day care or gatherings at houses. 
Those whose youth baseball seasons are postponed may still congregate at the local park for 
pick-up games. Adults who can no longer go to concerts may attend house parties instead. Strong 
stay-at-home directives shut down these alternate routes of socialization and transmission.  
Of course, the practicality of lengthy SIPOs is another matter. Although a large majority 
of Americans currently believe social distancing efforts should be the top priority right now, 
viewpoints are highly partisan (CBS/YouGov, 2020). Many states – including Kentucky – have 
witnessed small but vocal protests against SIPOs and other restrictions based on frustration about 
economic security and individual liberty (Bogel-Burroughs and Peters, 2020). Recent 
calculations find that the approximately 90 percent health-related benefits of the lockdown 
 
4 There is currently considerable debate over the true infection fatality rate, which is much lower than the case 
fatality rate because of asymptomatic or mild infections going untreated and limitations in testing access. However, 
that debate is irrelevant here: because we measure effects on confirmed cases, the case fatality rate is the appropriate 
one to use. In other words, if we were able to examine infections rather than cases, the fatality rate would be lower, 
but the number of infections averted would be higher by the same proportion.   
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accrue to individuals aged 50 and over, while the job losses and economic harm accrue more to 
younger and healthier individuals – particularly those in relatively low-wage professions whose 
work cannot easily move online (Greenstone and Vishan, 2020). Therefore, social distancing 
shutdowns essentially represent a regressive transfer, and compliance among those bearing more 
of the costs but receiving less of the benefits is likely to erode without sufficient measures to 
mitigate those costs. Economists often argue against comprehensive social safety net programs 
on the grounds that they discourage work, but this argument is irrelevant when the job losses are 
involuntary, unrelated to performance, and (hopefully) temporary. All levels of government 
should deliver economic aid with the same sense of urgency with which they adopted public 
health measures. Moving forward, it is likely that the effectiveness of the latter will be 
proportional to the effectiveness of the former.   
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Figure 1: Fraction of Population in Southern and Midwestern States Covered by Social-Distancing Measures 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations from population-weighted county data. The red lines indicate Kentucky’s adoption dates. 
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Figure 2: Estimated Impacts of Social-Distancing Measures over Time from Event-Study Model 
 
Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals were derived from authors’ event-study regression using daily county-level data 
from March 5-April 25 from the South and Midwest Census Regions, weighted by population. Day and county fixed effects were 
included. Standard errors were heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
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Figure 3: Social-Distancing Policies Flatten the Curve of Confirmed Kentucky COVID-19 Cases 
  
Notes: Predicted cumulative cases each day in Kentucky with distancing policy variables set to 0 are derived from authors’ event-
study regression using daily county-level data from March 5-April 25 from the South and Midwest Census Regions, weighted by 
population.  
